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STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE: EMERGENCY INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR PEACE, NORMALCY AND RECONSTRUCTION OF WAR-STRICKEN AFGHANISTAN

Report of the Secretary-General

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 48/208, which was adopted without a vote on 21 December 1993. In that resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General:

(a) To dispatch to Afghanistan, as soon as possible, a United Nations special mission to canvass a broad spectrum of the leaders of Afghanistan, soliciting their views on how the United Nations can best assist Afghanistan in facilitating national rapprochement and reconstruction, and to submit its findings, conclusions and recommendations to the Secretary-General for appropriate action;

(b) To develop the Action Plan for Immediate Rehabilitation, prepared by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), into a full-scale strategy for rehabilitation and reconstruction, based on an in-country assessment by a team of experts of the war damage and destruction;

(c) To initiate, taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations special mission to Afghanistan, a plan for mobilizing financial, technical and material assistance, including the possibility of convening a conference of donor States and international financial institutions.

2. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the overall situation in Afghanistan and make available his good offices.

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3. The Assembly further requested the Secretary-General to report to it at its forty-ninth session on the progress made in the implementation of the resolution. The present report is submitted in accordance with that request.

II. THE SPECIAL MISSION AND THE POLITICAL SITUATION

4. In accordance with operative paragraph 4 (a) of resolution 48/208, on 11 February 1994 I appointed Ambassador Mahmoud Mestiri, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia, to head the special mission to Afghanistan. Mr. Mestiri submitted his progress report to me in June, and this was subsequently issued in document A/49/208-S/1994/766. The present report covers the work of the special mission since that progress report.

5. The Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan, headed by my Personal Representative, Mr. Sotirios Mousouris, continued to monitor the overall situation in Afghanistan. Mr. Mousouris remained Deputy Head of the special mission.

A. National rapprochement

1. The second phase

6. On 22 July 1994, the United Nations special mission to Afghanistan began the second phase of its work, initiating in-depth and intensive consultations with representatives of the warring sides, leaders of the "neutral" parties, representatives of the Herat Gathering and other prominent Afghans, including the Governor of Ningarhar, Haji Kadir.

7. One side involved in the fighting is the Supreme Coordination Council, which is composed of four parties: Hezb-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan (Hekmatyar), the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (Dostum), Hezb-i-Wahdat-e-Afghanistan (Mazari) and the Afghanistan National Liberation Front (Mojaddedi). The other side is a coalition of two parties supporting President Rabbani: Jamiat-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan and Ittehad-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan. The leaders of the "neutral" parties at that time were Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani (National Islamic Front for Afghanistan), Ayatollah Asef Mohseini (Harakat-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan) and Maulawi Mohammed Nabi Mohammadi (Harakat-i-Inquilab-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan).

8. The Herat Gathering was convened in July 1994 by Governor Ismael Khan, an important leader of Jamiat-i-Islami, and produced a number of interesting conclusions regarding a solution to the conflict. The Gathering, however, was boycotted by most of the Afghan political parties.

9. The initial consultations of the special mission identified agreement, in principle, on three significant elements necessary to implement a comprehensive peace process in Afghanistan: a fully representative preparatory committee, transitional arrangements, and the convening of a Loya Jirga (grand assembly). These consultations also brought to light the need for, and the possibility of holding, a joint preliminary meeting of the warring parties in order to further the peace process.

10. With effect from 5 August 1994, therefore, the Head of the special mission focused his efforts on trying to bring together the warring parties. As these discussions progressed, the issue of the representation of General Dostum emerged as the principal point of contention. Despite the many compromise proposals and formulae that were suggested, it proved impossible to hold this preliminary meeting because of the refusal by certain parties to accept General Dostum's participation in it. As a result, the special mission held several separate meetings with representatives of the Supreme Coordination Council and neutral leaders on the one hand, and with representatives of President Rabbani, the Herat Gathering and the same neutral leaders, on the other.

11. At the end of this phase, on 2 September 1994, Mr. Mestiri stated that the inability of the warring parties to hold the joint preliminary meeting clearly indicated that the commitment to peace was not yet sufficiently strong or widespread to overcome the obstacles that are inherent in any negotiation process.

12. During my visit to Pakistan from 6 to 8 September 1994, I met separately with two of the neutral party leaders, with the representative of Mr. Rabbani, with the representatives of the Supreme Coordination Council and with independent Afghans. In a statement on 7 September, I noted with regret that the efforts to convene a joint meeting of the warring factions and leaders of the neutral parties had not been successful. The United Nations was not discouraged by this obstacle and would continue its efforts. Crucial to the success of the peace process was the involvement of all segments of the Afghan population, including independent groups and "personalities". All Afghan leaders, particularly those involved in the conflict, must heed the overwhelming desire for peace expressed by the Afghan people and cooperate with the United Nations special mission in the search for a lasting cease-fire and a fully representative national political process. This was an opportunity that should not be missed. The United Nations was ready to assist the Afghan people in emerging from fratricidal conflict and curbing unwarranted foreign interference in their internal affairs. I also called on all countries to continue their support of the United Nations in this regard.

13. On 8 September 1994, I instructed the Head of the special mission to take the steps necessary to convene a meeting of independent Afghan personalities, including intellectuals, religious leaders, former ministers, commanders and others inside and outside Afghanistan, for the purpose of advising the United Nations on how to help bring peace to Afghanistan. Many of these Afghans, despite having been excluded from the political process or marginalized at its edge, were none the less recognized and respected by the vast majority of the Afghan people.

14. This advisory group was intended to bring into the political process moderate and constructive actors, who would be seen by the Afghan people as capable of representing their views and whom it would be impossible for the political leaders to reject. The advisory group could help to break the present stalemate, thus making it possible to move beyond old formulae that had been tried without success and to produce ideas for peace, which would be viewed as non-partisan.

2. The third phase: the Quetta process

15. The Head of the special mission initiated the first meeting of the advisory group on 29 September 1994, at Quetta, Pakistan. The meetings lasted 19 days, ending on 17 October. The group, initially composed of some 20 people, was later doubled on the recommendation of its members so as to take better account of the geographical and ethnic balance of Afghanistan, thereby strengthening its representative nature. Almost all of the additional advisers came from inside Afghanistan, many of them being military leaders. This expansion added further credibility to the group's recommendations.

16. The advisory group established three subcommittees: political, cease-fire and security. Each prepared a report which was adopted by the plenary of the advisory group. These reports identified the basic causes of the conflict in an impartial manner and outlined non-partisan proposals for solutions to it.

The report of the political subcommittee

17. The political subcommittee focused on the following aspects of the Afghan conflict: external factors, internal realities and circumstances and the formation of a transitional government. Regarding the formation of a transitional government, the political subcommittee concentrated, inter alia, on its legitimacy, its composition, its responsibilities and authority, and its duration. The advisory group felt that the quickest way to establish a transitional government would be for an authoritative council, composed of the warring parties, neutral parties, and independent personalities, to appoint it directly.

The report of the cease-fire subcommittee

18. The cease-fire subcommittee emphasized the need for an immediate cessation of hostilities. It argued that the proposed cease-fire should be based on an agreement between the warring parties that would be brokered by the United Nations. Its central elements would be as follows:

(a) The cease-fire should be unconditional and country-wide;

(b) Roads and highways should be opened to the public, and all illegal check-points should be removed throughout the country;

(c) Kabul and its suburbs should be demilitarized, and all armed forces from these areas should be evacuated and heavy weapons collected.

The report of the security subcommittee

19. The security subcommittee called for the formation of a security force (initially for Kabul), which it believed to be essential for the survival of the transitional government and the maintenance of a cease-fire. The security force for Kabul would number 20,000 (including officers, professional personnel, troops and support staff). The subcommittee suggested that all expenses and financial requirements of the force be borne by the international community, through the United Nations. The subcommittee felt that the force could become

the nucleus of a national army. (While undertaking the commitment of the United Nations to the peace process in Afghanistan, the special mission, of course, entered into no commitment regarding financial support for the security force.)

Political contacts

20. The Quetta process also included discussions with the representatives of the warring parties, who met not only with the special mission but also with its Afghan advisers. In these meetings, the Afghan advisers often challenged the basic assumptions that the warring parties had used to justify their positions with regard to the conflict. During this period, the Head of the special mission received an important communication from Mr. Rabbani expressing his readiness for a transfer of power through a mechanism which would prevent his opponents from taking advantage of it. This represented a significant advance from his position during the second phase. The Head of the special mission was able to use this to further his efforts to develop a mechanism for a transfer of power and a cease-fire.

21. Towards the end of the meeting at Quetta, the special mission and some of the Afghan advisers met with representatives of the warring sides and the neutral parties. In these discussions, the Head of the special mission focused on Mr. Rabbani's message and, in particular, on the practicalities of a transfer of power and a lasting cease-fire. He also discussed the establishment of a security force. The framework emerging from the Quetta process and the United Nations discussions with the parties made it possible to develop concrete United Nations proposals which offered a way of breaking the present stalemate. In addition, the Quetta process helped further to mobilize Afghan public opinion in support of the United Nations peace efforts.

22. The main feature of the United Nations proposals is the establishment of an authoritative council to serve as a decision-making forum. It would be composed of representatives of the warring factions, neutral parties and independent "personalities" and would create a transitional government, oversee a permanent cease-fire and establish a neutral security force. It could also itself be the recipient of the transfer of power.

3. Efforts after Quetta

23. Once the Quetta process was completed, the Head of the special mission travelled to Afghanistan to meet the leaders of the warring parties and discuss with them how the above-mentioned proposals could be put into effect. He met Mr. Rabbani twice at Jalalabad, on 18 and 19 October 1994. Mr. Rabbani accepted, in principle, the idea of the authoritative council and reiterated his readiness to step down. But he needed to study the details of the proposals further and to consult with his allies. The Head of the special mission also met Mr. Rabbani with Mr. Mohammed Nabi Mohammadi and Mr. Akbari (leader of a breakaway faction of Hezb-i-Wahdat) and emphasized that all sides in the fighting, including General Dostum, had to be represented in the political process if the goal of ending the fighting was to be achieved. The following day, the Head of the special mission met the same interlocutors in the presence of some of the Afghan advisers.

24. Several days later, he travelled from Jalalabad to Naghlu (60 kilometres south-east of Kabul), where he met with Mr. Hekmatyar and his senior advisers and discussed with them in detail, in the presence of the Afghan advisers, the proposals he had submitted to Mr. Rabbani. Mr. Hekmatyar agreed that a council should be formed immediately, to be made up of the warring sides, neutral parties and independent "personalities", though he combined these last two into one group. He agreed that power should be transferred either to the council or to a transitional government and that a permanent cease-fire should be established, roads opened and Kabul demilitarized. He linked the cease-fire to the transfer of power.

25. After these meetings with Mr. Hekmatyar, the Head of the special mission travelled to Jabal-seraj (70 kilometres north of Kabul), where he met General Ahmad Shah Massoud (the leading military personality in the Rabbani alliance). General Massoud said that he was ready for an unconditional cease-fire whenever the United Nations said it should go into effect. He supported in principle the idea of a council composed of the warring parties, neutral parties and independent personalities. He also supported the inclusion of more independent personalities. He said he would consult with other Jamiat officials about the details of the United Nations proposals. He agreed that the first step of a political process had to be the formation of a council. But he raised the significant question of whether the United Nations would desert the process if the situation were to change. Could the Afghan people count on the permanent involvement of the United Nations in the peace process? The Head of the special mission assured him that the United Nations commitment to peace in Afghanistan was strong.

26. The Head of the special mission then travelled to Mazar-i-Sharif to meet General Dostum, who expressed his full support for the United Nations efforts and proposals. He agreed on the need to include independent personalities and was flexible on the modalities of his representation on the council.

27. Thereafter, on 31 October 1994, the Head of the special mission went to Herat, where he met Governor Ismael Khan and emphasized that peace could not be achieved without the participation of all the warring parties. Governor Ismael Khan said that he would support the United Nations peace efforts.

B. National reconstruction

28. As already mentioned in the progress report of 1 July 1994 (A/49/208-S/1994/766), there is consensus that a major international effort to assist in the reconstruction of Afghanistan is essential, with particular emphasis on the physical infrastructure of the country, as well as the re-establishment of medical and educational systems, rebuilding public administration and addressing the problem of narcotics production. Many view the lack of economic alternatives as one of the factors which keep the war going. All Afghans, including the leaders, are in favour of restarting reconstruction efforts as soon as possible and view this as integral to establishing a sustainable peace process. Political and economic activity must work together in Afghanistan in ways that encourage peace.

29. In areas where United Nations assistance programmes have already been implemented, sustainable activity, more responsible leadership and effective administration are evident. The methodology involved enhances community participation and the building of stability at the local level, leading to the resumption of economic activity.

30. During August 1994, the Resident Representative of UNDP and the economist of the special mission held a series of consultations with Afghan leaders in the main regions of the country to identify a range of projects which would be suitable for immediate implementation and attractive to donors as a means of indicating their confidence in and support for the overall peace process. The total value of these projects is approximately $105 million. They include: an expansion of activities already being successfully implemented by the United Nations, for which a logistical support capacity and management structure is already in place; new programmes in areas not adequately addressed in the past, such as health and education; and special projects with high local visibility and impact that either provide large-scale employment or are labour intensive, thereby giving credibility to the United Nations and the peace process as well as to local leaders. Details of these projects are contained in annex I. Member States are being approached by UNDP to support, either bilaterally or multilaterally, the projects identified as being of highest priority, with due respect for regional balance and neutrality. However, progress in the peace process remains a precondition for increased donor interest and approval of investment for reconstruction.

III. REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

A. Beginning the rehabilitation process

31. By the end of 1993, agreement had been reached with the authorities in Kabul on the final text of the Action Plan for Immediate Rehabilitation prepared by UNDP with the participation of all other United Nations agencies operational in Afghanistan, the multilateral lending institutions and coordinating bodies of the non-governmental organizations. In December 1993, a series of individual briefings were arranged with representatives of major donor countries to inform them of the work done, in the optimistic belief that a stable government could soon be formed with which a more detailed policy dialogue could begin, leading to the formulation of a detailed rehabilitation strategy that could, in turn, be presented to a donor conference. In the last week of December 1993, the Resident Representative of UNDP for Afghanistan and the Chief of the World Bank resident mission in Pakistan held discussions with the authorities at Kabul, restarting a relationship with the multilateral lending institutions that had ceased 14 years before. The outbreak of renewed hostilities in the capital on the first day of 1994, with a new set of alliances, was a serious setback to this process. The main functions of government have since collapsed, as many members of the civil service have taken refuge elsewhere, and this has made it impossible to begin a policy dialogue at the national level until the peace process can move forward.

B. United Nations activities already under way

32. The United Nations development system has nevertheless continued throughout the last year to carry out operations in the many parts of the country that are peaceful. In most of the 29 provinces, the rehabilitation process, assisted by the United Nations and the many non-governmental organizations operating in Afghanistan, has been under way for several years following the departure of Soviet troops in 1988 and has greatly facilitated the return of some 2 million refugees to date. In the more remote parts of the country, which were less affected by the war, Afghans have reached the limits of available technology and are in a development situation no different from that of poor, mountain peoples elsewhere in Western Asia. The United Nations has, therefore, continued to provide a range of assistance programmes that are flexible and appropriate, respond to priorities identified with local leaders and aim at furthering economic productivity with the maximum community participation, in the hope that building stability at the village and district level will gradually contribute to the national political process.

33. During the last year, the majority of the United Nations operational activities for rehabilitation in Afghanistan focused on human development and poverty alleviation and consisted of a coherent group of programmes/projects aimed at directly assisting rural communities. A certain amount of assistance is targeted for urban areas, particularly for shelter and water supply. Primary rural target areas are those that are peaceful and therefore have refugee-return potential. The two large-scale UNDP rural rehabilitation umbrella programmes in the north and the south, engaged in the sectors of crop production and protection, livestock health, irrigation, feeder roads, and water and sanitation, spent some US$ 12 million on small-scale rural interventions. These activities, which were executed by UNDP/Office for Project Services, were implemented through subcontracts with national and international non-governmental organizations. They have successfully established a particular methodology to develop better consultation with and participation by the local communities. UNDP/Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) programmes addressing crop production and protection spent over $1.5 million in the last year.

34. Under the agricultural rehabilitation programme, over 4,000 tons of high quality seed of improved varieties of food crops and 1,000 tons of cotton seeds (largely funded by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan and the European Community and to a lesser extent by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) were dispatched and distributed to farmers as a package with over 450 tons of fertilizer. A well-equipped seed testing laboratory has been established in Mazar-i-Sharif, and the seed processing plants there and at Herat have been repaired. The total yield from imported seed distributed by the above programmes is calculated to have exceeded 80,000 tons, more than the total World Food Programme grain delivered to Afghanistan last year. In addition, the irrigation of 125,000 hectares of land increased production/grain yield by another 100,000 tons. A series of training courses were organized in various aspects of agronomy, seed and crop production and plant protection across most of the major wheat-growing areas in northern Afghanistan, including the training of 30 supervisors/trainers and 239 crop extension workers in locust/sunpest

control covering over 190,000 hectares of crop land. Over 20,000 farmers were trained through extension services. FAO, with funds from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan, provided some 13,800 high quality budded fruit trees to farmers through non-governmental organizations. WFP food-for-work projects assisted in the rehabilitation of over 8,000 hectares of orchards.

35. For livestock health, UNDP/Office for Project Services contracted 21 non-governmental organizations to treat a total of 19.3 million animals and 177 districts to be covered by veterinary field units at a cost of $3.1 million. The UNDP/FAO veterinary services project, based at Mazar, conducted training courses for veterinarians, paraveterinarians and vaccinators, and distributed vaccines, equipment and medicines in 11 northern provinces. Privatization of veterinary services is now well established in both UNDP/Office for Project Services and UNDP/FAO project areas. Under a UNDP/FAO sericulture project 2,500 boxes of silkworm eggs donated by the Government of China were distributed to more than 1,300 families in 7 districts of northern and western Afghanistan.

36. In irrigation, UNDP/Office for Project Services, under the northern rural rehabilitation programme, rehabilitated 169 kilometres of canals, 14 primary supply/source structures, 7 secondary delivery structures and 46 canal protection structures, ensuring reliable supply of water to 305 villages with a crop area of 65,701 hectares. Under the southern programme, 56 sub-projects were implemented by non-governmental organizations for the rehabilitation of over 1,023 kilometres of canals and karezes and the reconstruction of 227,800 cubic metres of structures. Using funds from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan, FAO continued work on the rehabilitation of traditional irrigation systems in the lower Kunar valley and East Paktia, and started new work in Nangahar and Laghman, bringing an estimated 12,318 hectares back into production. WFP food-for-work projects contributed to the cleaning of 1,500 kilometres of canals and 16,000 metres of karezes. UNHCR funded 25 irrigation projects in 6 provinces which were implemented through UNDP/Office for Project Services and non-governmental organizations, and 24 projects in 4 other provinces which were self-implemented. All 49 UNHCR projects made use of food-for-work from WFP. The combined effects of the UNDP/Office for Project Services, FAO, UNHCR and WFP programmes have been dramatic, playing a major role in the return of large numbers of refugees and the restoration of agriculture in these provinces.

37. WFP food-for-work projects contributed to the repair of 1,296 kilometres of roads. In addition, some 50 villages were provided with better road access in northern Afghanistan and rehabilitation of 52 kilometres of roads was completed by UNDP/Office for Project Services through 17 subcontracted non-governmental organizations in the south and east. UNHCR funded the rehabilitation of key structures (bridges, culverts) through six projects in Herat (implemented by UNDP/Office for Project Services), one project in Logar implemented by a non-governmental organization, and six projects in Herat and Nimroz that were self-implemented.

38. In the health, water supply and sanitation sector, major accomplishments included a range of activities covering both emergency assistance and rehabilitation. As it is impossible to categorize these separately, no attempt

has been made to distinguish them. WHO spent $3.2 million from its regular budget and $1.5 million through the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan, while UNICEF expenditure was over $8 million from general resources and supplementary funds. WFP also implemented food-for-work projects, detailed below. WHO, along with the Ministry of Public Health, identified priority activities for strengthening casualty departments of hospitals in six regions, disease control, in-services training and retraining of health personnel. UNICEF and WHO supported the training of health workers in all aspects of primary health care with emphasis on maternal and child health care. Emergency health support was provided to displaced families in Mazar and Jalalabad, to Tajik refugees in the north and to regional, provincial and district level hospitals. UNICEF and WHO also provided surgical kits and support for rehabilitation of hospitals and health centres, including a number of generators, heaters, ambulances and fuel. In addition, WHO transferred about 100 tons of medical supplies to Kabul for emergency medical treatment. The expanded programme of immunization of UNICEF focused on the under-two-year target groups.

39. Water and sanitation activities by UNICEF expanded in 10 provinces. Five hundred and seventy hand-pumps were installed and 450 others repaired. One hundred and eighty deep-wells were drilled and 16 deep production wells installed with submersible power pumps. Sixteen kilometres of pipes were installed for pumping and distribution of drinking water. Water systems of major hospitals in Mazar, Kabul, Herat and Jalalabad were repaired. UNDP/Office for Project Services provided assistance to Herat Hospital and Antany and Jamburiat Hospitals at Kabul. UNDP/Office for Project Services provided 149 villages with rehabilitated and improved water supply, reaching 120,000 people in northern provinces. UNDP/Office for Project Services restored the electricity and water supply for Kabul city four times during lulls in recurrent fighting, providing piped water to over 400,000 during the cholera epidemic. WFP also implemented 14 food-for-work sanitation projects and 6 water supply projects.

40. In the shelter sector, UNDP/United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) continued to support and facilitate the reconstruction activities of war-affected communities in both rural and urban areas of Afghanistan. The programme has focused on activities which aim to improve availability of affordable building materials for the reconstruction of housing and community facilities, establishing or upgrading production enterprises to improve the supply of concrete beams, windows and doors. To date, more than 8,000 families have been assisted by direct support in construction of shelter under the programme, with a further 10,000 families benefiting from community upgrading or relief activities supported by UNCHS with inputs from UNDP ($2 million last year), UNHCR, UNICEF and the Governments of the United Kingdom, Norway and the Netherlands. WFP food-for-work projects have also been supervised by UNCHS, with a total output of 6,800 houses reconstructed during the year. In addition to its emergency relief programmes, including urban food security, WFP provided over 32,000 tons of food aid for rehabilitation in all parts of Afghanistan, with seven field offices, at Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Bamyan, Faizabad, Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat.

41. For basic education, UNICEF assisted with rehabilitation of 15 schools in Herat and provided education kits to schools in Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul and Faizabad. Through WFP food-for-work projects 23 schools were repaired during the year. UNESCO, using funds from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan, continued to distribute basic education materials in a cross-border programme from Pakistan. Similarly, ILO, also funded by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan, carried out technical skills training for 138 Afghans with three mobile units in south-west Afghanistan from a base at Quetta. For services for the disabled, UNDP/Office for Project Services contracted five non-governmental organizations, which provided 5,901 disabled Afghans with training, treatment and integration in local communities in six provinces using funds from the Government of Sweden. UNDP/ILO contracted three non-governmental organizations to undertake skills training for the disabled in eight provinces, including the placement of 629 disabled persons in community training, a survey of 4,000 disabled persons, placement of 34 disabled persons in employment, training courses for employment support workers and distribution of donations.

42. The United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), developed a community rehabilitation strategy against drug abuse to attract support from local communities to combat production, processing, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs. UNDCP funded more than 50 infrastructure rehabilitation projects and sub-projects implemented by non-governmental organizations aimed at improved education, health, income generation and agricultural production and at training for Afghans. A detoxification facility was established in Badakhshan Province for the treatment of drug addicts. UNDCP conducted 17 drug-awareness in-house training courses for more than 378 medical practitioners, teachers, religious leaders, community workers, staff of non-governmental organizations, resource women and health workers. Drug awareness was enhanced by a number of events carried out in the refugee camps and inside Afghanistan. More than 160,000 items of publicity material were distributed during 1993.

43. A total of 73 United Nations Volunteers (UNV) specialists, funded by UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, WFP and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan, based in Afghanistan and Pakistan, provided services to the United Nations system in 1993. They provided technical assistance in basic education and technical training, water supply and environmental sanitation, health, veterinary science, seed technology, plant protection and emergency power supply. They also provided assistance in food aid monitoring and management, voluntary repatriation and emergency programmes.

C. The link between humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation

44. A large portion of the United Nations assistance during the last year has been devoted to humanitarian relief. In parallel with its ongoing rehabilitation work, the United Nations development system has been able to support the work of the United Nations humanitarian programme in meeting immediate, life-sustaining needs. It has done this by providing a corps of specialized staff with a well-established logistical support capacity capable of assisting in the delivery of emergency relief and, at the same time, ensuring

that the design of the operation helps generate maximum local participation and commitment, setting the stage for more sustainable rehabilitation and reconstruction in the future. In the last year, technical and logistical contributions by the United Nations development system for the humanitarian programme included, inter alia: road repair, facilitating the return of refugees; piped water supply in Herat, and water and sanitation facilities in Herat regional hospital; distribution of shelter materials to the displaced in Kabul and surrounding areas; supervision of sanitation programmes in Kabul; technical supervision and delivery of agricultural inputs from a variety of donors; technical and management backstopping of community-based services for disabled Afghans; coordination and monitoring of women's programmes funded by the Nordic Fund; and provision of UNV specialists as food-aid monitors, voluntary repatriation monitors, logistics specialists and emergency programmes managers.

D. Narcotics

45 Since the beginning of the armed conflict in 1979, income from opium production and trafficking has contributed significantly to supplementing the meagre means of livelihood for the people of Afghanistan. Income from this source has also supported armed resistance groups. Opium production has intensified with the recent return of more than 2 million refugees, many of whom have resettled in the main poppy growing areas, notably Nangahar and Helmand, and has been exacerbated by the progressive collapse of the Government and the breakdown of authority, law and order. A recent UNDCP survey of poppy cultivation in eight opium-producing provinces of Afghanistan revealed a further sharp expansion in estimates of production compared to the previous year when the dry opium yield was estimated at around 2,000 tons. Afghanistan thereby figures among the world's largest producers of illicit opium. The increased production has already affected Afghanistan's neighbours. Apart from the long-standing effects in Pakistan and Iran, there is now evidence of escalating drug traffic via the Central Asian Republics on the northern border of Afghanistan.

46. As noted in the progress report of the United Nations special mission, the lack of central authority and the instability in the country have contributed to an increase in production and trafficking of illicit drugs. Further exacerbated by the paucity of resources in the decisive transition from emergency to reconstruction and the absence of alternative income opportunities, this alarming situation, if unchecked, will not only increase drug abuse in Afghanistan and in its neighbours, but will also have serious implications for the country's political future as well as for the global spread of the drug menace. It calls for urgent concerted efforts by all national and international bodies to integrate drug control concerns into the priority agenda for political reconciliation, economic rehabilitation and reconstruction, and in the longer-term sustainable development in Afghanistan. For the first time, detailed baseline data on opium production at the village level are now available. The survey results will be shared by the United Nations with all donors, with a view to developing a common strategy that will ensure that assistance benefits those not producing opium, and that those producing opium do not receive assistance unless specific agreements are reached with the local communities on firm commitments and achievements in the reduction of opium poppy cultivation.

IV. EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

47. At its forty-eighth session, the General Assembly urgently appealed to all organizations and programmes of the United Nations system, specialized agencies and other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, and urged all Member States to respond to United Nations consolidated appeals issued for this purpose.

48. Since the last report of the Secretary-General, there have been three new consolidated appeals for emergency humanitarian assistance. The first was issued in October 1993 and covered needs arising during the six-month period of winter. The October appeal sought a total of $59.8 million. As at 31 March 1994, $32.4 million had been pledged or contributed towards this appeal. The second appeal was issued in April 1994, for the six-month summer period. It reflected the urgent new needs which had arisen as a result of the renewed outbreak of hostilities in Kabul in January 1994. It sought $62.1 million, of which $25.5 million was required in order to respond to the new humanitarian developments, and $36.6 million was required for the continuation of the existing humanitarian programmes. As of 30 September, $31.1 million had been pledged or contributed towards this appeal.

49. The most recent appeal, launched on 10 November 1994, requests $106.4 million to cover the one-year period from 1 October 1994 to 30 September 1995 and the specific needs of the winter and summer seasons. The emphasis for winter is on emergency help for up to 800,000 displaced persons, of whom 350,000 are in camps near Jalalabad. During the summer, the focus will be on the repatriation and reintegration of 700,000 refugees from Iran and Pakistan. United Nations agencies will also support the clearance of 20 square kilometres of minefields, the distribution of 230,000 tons of food aid, emergency programmes in the fields of health, water supply and sanitation, and a mass-immunization campaign.

50. I will continue to review the humanitarian situation in view of the ongoing developments in Afghanistan. Renewed consolidated appeals for emergency humanitarian assistance will be issued, as appropriate.

A. Implementation of humanitarian programmes

1. Internally displaced persons

The situation in Kabul

51. The fighting in Kabul since 1 January 1994 has been of an intensity never experienced before. The scale of destruction has been unprecedented. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimates that 7,000 people were killed and more than 80,000 injured in the first nine months of the year. The suffering of ordinary civilians has been further exacerbated by an economic blockade of the city. Prices of essential goods have far outstripped the resources of most of the estimated 1 million remaining inhabitants, who have been living in fear and destitution. As of the end of September 1994, over 300,000 people were believed to be displaced within the city, many living in

public buildings and others living in overcrowded conditions with family members or friends. When I was in Islamabad in early September 1994, I appealed for a moratorium on the shelling and rocketing of civilian areas in and around Kabul to facilitate the delivery of urgently needed humanitarian supplies.

52. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance for Afghanistan has worked continuously with WFP to obtain access to all parts of Kabul where there are people in need and to ensure the delivery of emergency relief supplies. Between 1 January and 31 July 1994, WFP delivered to the Kabul region some 7,000 tons of wheat and wheat flour, as well as 100 tons of supplementary food and medical supplies for UNICEF, 90 tons of medical supplies from WHO and 55 tons of relief materials from the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat). The WFP food aid was distributed to the most needy displaced persons by a number of non-governmental organizations working in Kabul. WFP food aid was also made available to ICRC for Kabul. UNICEF national staff established 30 centres for nutrition and oral rehydration therapy, at which 5,000 children received help every week. UNICEF also installed and repaired hand pumps for clear water supply. WHO provided medical supplies to the hospitals and clinics operated by the Ministry of Public Health. Habitat supported projects in the fields of water supply and sanitation.

The situation in Jalalabad

53. As soon as the fighting erupted in Kabul on 1 January 1994, an exodus of displaced persons from that city took place. The vast majority headed east, towards Jalalabad and the border with Pakistan. On 12 January, the Government of Pakistan closed its borders to these new arrivals, and later imposed passport and visa requirements for all Afghan nationals. As a result of this decision, the number of displaced people in Jalalabad rose dramatically. The Jalalabad authorities allocated a site at Sar Shahi, 20 kilometres away, for the establishment of a camp. As of 30 September, this camp and smaller camps nearby accommodated nearly 350,000 persons.

54. The United Nations agencies, with the support of a number of non-governmental organizations, mounted a major relief operation for displaced persons in Jalalabad. Under the overall coordination of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan, UNHCR supervised the layout and management of the camp at Sar Shahi and ensured the supply of tents and other household equipment. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan supervised the clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance from the site. WFP provided the food requirements and managed the logistics for the whole operation. UNICEF supervised the water supply, which involved the continuous mobilization of 30 tankers, while WHO coordinated the provision of health services. At the request of other agencies involved in the assistance programmes, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan has assumed managerial responsibility for the camp at Sar Shahi. In addition to the assistance in the camps, the United Nations agencies also provided support for the displaced in the city. WFP organized a bakeries project, in which over 100,000 needy people living in Jalalabad received subsidized bread.

55. Thousands of people from Kabul have sought refuge in communities in other parts of Afghanistan. The United Nations agencies and their non-governmental organization partners have tried to integrate the needs of these communities into their ongoing humanitarian programmes.

2. Mine clearance

56. Substantial progress has now been made in the removal of land-mines from the priority areas to which refugees have returned or are seeking to return. Nevertheless, the presence of land-mines remains one of the major constraints preventing refugees from deciding to return to their homes.

57. The Mine Clearance Programme of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan comprises four main components: mine-awareness, minefield survey, mine-clearance training and mine clearance. It is implemented by seven Afghan non-governmental organizations, employing over 2,500 Afghan nationals. During the period under review, the Programme continued to operate in 19 provinces of Afghanistan, without serious security constraints.

58. In March 1994, the report of the national survey of the mines situation in Afghanistan showed that there were 456 square kilometres of minefields in Afghanistan, of which 113.5 square kilometres were classified as high priority for clearance. As of 15 July, the Mine Clearance Programme of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan had cleared 45.1 square kilometres of the priority areas, leaving some 68.4 square kilometres still to be cleared. At present rates of clearance, this will require another four to five years.

59. A total of $7.5 million was received for the Mine Clearance Programme against the October 1993 appeal, and $3.8 million had been pledged as at 31 July against the April 1994 appeal.

3. Voluntary repatriation

60. Approximately 945,500 Afghan refugees returned to their homes in 1993, of which 605,500 were from Iran and 340,000 from Pakistan. Of this number, 337,495 refugees from Iran and 132,627 from Pakistan took advantage of the repatriation grant programme supported by UNHCR and WFP. Although substantially fewer than originally projected, these numbers nevertheless represent a major repatriation movement.

61. A Tripartite Repatriation Commission, established in August 1993 by UNHCR and the Governments of the Islamic State of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and a similar commission established earlier by UNHCR and the Governments of the Islamic State of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, met regularly during the period under review. All concerned Governments continued to guarantee the right of Afghan refugees to return voluntarily.

62. Despite the heavy fighting in Kabul during the first nine months of 1994, repatriation of refugees from Iran and Pakistan continued. UNHCR reported that 83,678 refugees from Iran and 25,708 from Pakistan took advantage of the repatriation grants between 1 January and 30 September 1994, although the numbers observed crossing the border from Pakistan to Afghanistan have been considerably higher.

63. The International Organization for Migration continued to operate a programme of subsidized transport in Iran. The programme from Herat to the northern provinces had to be suspended in October 1993, as the result of increased security hazards and deteriorating road conditions. Efforts are being made to develop an alternative route through Turkmenistan.

64. Through its quick impact projects, UNHCR, with the cooperation of WFP, assisted returning families to rebuild their homes and supported irrigation and drinking-water projects, as well as road-repair and income-generation projects, in returnee communities. However, shortage of resources limited the scale of these activities and it is felt that, aside from the security problems, the lack of sufficient support inside Afghanistan may be hampering the return of refugees from Iran and Pakistan.

4. Food assistance

65. Food aid has been provided by WFP to assist displaced persons, particularly in Kabul and Jalalabad; to support the voluntary repatriation from Pakistan and Iran; to provide emergency feeding in areas struck by earthquakes, landslides, floods or drought; to provide food to vulnerable groups such as widows, orphans, and disabled and displaced persons; and to provide food-for-work programmes to help local communities to undertake public utility works and to generate temporary employment opportunities. An estimated 2 million Afghans in all parts of the country benefited from these programmes in 1993. The emphasis of the activities of WFP has remained the provision of food for life-sustaining activities. However, about half of all food assistance was allocated to the food-for-work programme, through which WFP also contributed to the ongoing rehabilitation work on roads, bridges, irrigation canals, water systems and public buildings, thus facilitating the repatriation and reintegration of hundreds of thousands of returning refugees.

66. A total of 54,000 tons of food aid was distributed in 1993. As at 30 September, 140,000 tons had been distributed in 1994.

5. Health, water supply and sanitation

67. Although security problems continued to hamper the implementation of several planned activities, WHO and UNICEF worked on the rehabilitation of the health services in most areas of the country. The focus was primarily on maternal and child health care. WHO and UNICEF provided emergency health support to displaced families in Kabul, Jalalabad, Mazar-i-Sharif and elsewhere, as well as help for emergency maternity care to a number of hospitals and health centres in 23 provinces. The educational radio and television programmes on

child survival development were continued. WHO provided training courses for health care workers in different fields and distributed essential drugs for maternal child health services. Because of the events in 1993 and early 1994, the provision of emergency medical supplies and equipment to health facilities became top priority for WHO.

68. After the cholera epidemic of June 1993 had been brought under control in October, programmes were concentrated on the prevention of communicable and diarrhoeal diseases through training, extension of diagnostic facilities and provision of preventive measures. The provision of safe water remained an important factor in the prevention of water-borne diseases. UNICEF carried out repairs to the water supply systems and upgraded delivery capacity in 10 provinces, including Kabul. Because of the complete breakdown of water and power supplies in Kabul since the beginning of 1994, Habitat undertook projects to improve water supplies, sanitation and drainage in and around public institutions and cleared out large quantities of waste through a food-for-work programme with WFP.

6. Agriculture

69. Support for the rehabilitation of agriculture in Afghanistan continued to provide returning refugees and displaced persons with a limited form of income, thus facilitating their resettlement. FAO provided high-quality seed and fertilizer, fruit trees and root stocks, renovated and restocked veterinary clinics, trained basic veterinary workers and extensionists in plant protection and, together with UNDP/Office for Project Services, restored village irrigation systems. Most of these activities were implemented through community-based small-scale projects.

7. Emergency support for social programmes

70. Although the emphasis of the humanitarian assistance was emergency relief programmes addressing physical needs, social programmes for basic education, vocational training and drug-abuse control continued to be supported in those areas of the country where their implementation was possible. UNICEF carried out projects in the north and the west. Education kits were distributed to schools in Herat, Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif and Faizabad. Schools in Herat were reopened, often in make-shift buildings. UNDCP provided basic educational facilities to boys and girls and skills training to adults in opium poppy growing regions in Afghanistan and organized special events in order to create greater awareness about the dangers of drug abuse. ILO provided training in occupational, as well as administrative and supervisory, skills to staff of non-governmental organizations.

B. Coordination and security

71. Throughout the period under review, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan has continued to provide coordination and logistical support for humanitarian programmes under the

direction of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan. In addition to its other activities, and in accordance with its mandate, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan continued to exercise responsibility for essential common service projects to support the activities of United Nations agencies participating in the humanitarian programmes.

72. Security of United Nations staff working in Afghanistan remains a major concern. Between mid-July 1993 and the end of the year, conditions in Kabul allowed the United Nations agencies to maintain a continuous presence of international staff in the city, on a rotating basis. It had been hoped that conditions would have improved to the point where a full international presence could have been resumed. However, the outbreak of heavy fighting in Kabul on 1 January 1994 forced the United Nations to evacuate all international staff on 8 January. Missions of international staff to Kabul were only possible during formal cease-fires declared for the visits of the United Nations special mission. The security situation in Kabul remains a major concern. It is hoped that conditions there will soon allow for the resumption of at least a limited presence of United Nations international staff.

73. Security concerns in other parts of Afghanistan have only occasionally impeded the work of the United Nations humanitarian agencies in 1994. During the reporting period, the United Nations agencies maintained a resident presence of international staff in Herat, Jalalabad and Mazar-i-Sharif, and regular missions were undertaken to Bamyan, Faizabad, Kandahar, Khost and other areas, as required.

74. In Herat, the focus was on support for refugees returning from Iran. In Kandahar, after a long period of instability which seriously limited the range of assistance activities, the United Nations agencies initiated humanitarian assistance efforts in June 1994. In eastern Afghanistan, particular attention has been given to mine clearance and irrigation repair in areas to which refugees from Pakistan are preparing to return, notably in Khost, Logar, Nangarhar and Paktia provinces. In the north, in addition to assistance to refugees returning from Iran and Pakistan and the efforts to meet emergency needs in chronic food deficit areas such as Badakshan and Bamyan provinces, assistance to refugees from Tajikistan and people displaced from Kabul has been provided.

V. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

75. Since March 1994, the efforts of the special mission have improved the prospects for peace in Afghanistan. The Quetta meeting succeeded in bringing together a group of personalities who reflected the broadly held views of the Afghan people and could not be viewed as being linked to any particular group or party. Its recommendations on an early transfer of power to an authoritative council, a country-wide cease-fire, a security force for Kabul and the subsequent establishment of a transitional government or the convening of a Loya Jirga have created a framework within which it may finally be possible to initiate a comprehensive and lasting solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. The success of the Quetta meeting in establishing a credible set of ideas, in a

manner consistent with the principle of broad-based participation, which is rooted in Afghan traditions, has given the United Nations a non-partisan basis on which it can develop practical peace proposals.

76. The key to progress lies in the earliest possible formation of the authoritative council. All sides seem to have accepted this idea, though several of them indicated that they needed more time to study and discuss the details of the set of ideas of the Quetta meeting. The composition of the council is likely to be a controversial issue, on which extensive further consultations may be required. Clearly those consultations should be entrusted to the special mission. I therefore intend to keep the special mission in existence, and I have asked its Head, Mr. Mahmoud Mestiri, to return to Afghanistan in the middle of December to resume this work. I have also asked him to make clear to his interlocutors that the early establishment of the authoritative council will be a test of the commitment of the Afghan leaders to the peace process, upon which the international community's readiness to continue its peacemaking efforts in Afghanistan will depend. I shall report to the General Assembly as soon as the outcome of this further phase in the work of the special mission is known.

77. The activities of the special mission in Afghanistan, and in particular Mr. Mestiri's ability to travel to many, though not all, parts of the country, have reinforced me in the view that it is necessary to establish a political presence of the United Nations in Afghanistan in order to support the special mission and maintain continuity of contact between the United Nations and the various leaders inside the country. I accordingly propose to establish a small office composed of a Director, a Political Affairs Officer, two Military Advisers and the necessary support staff. Initially, this office will be established at Jalalabad, but it will move to Kabul as soon as conditions there permit. The political functions of the Office of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is currently located at Islamabad, will be transferred to the office in Jalalabad/Kabul. Its members will travel, as necessary, to Pakistan (and indeed other neighbouring countries) in order to consult with Afghan leaders resident there. The United Nations humanitarian effort in Afghanistan will continue to be directed by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, which will return to Afghanistan as soon as possible. With these changes, and assuming the continuing existence of the special mission, I no longer believe it necessary to have a Personal Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the Assistant Secretary-General level.

78. The programme budget implications of the above proposals will shortly be submitted to the General Assembly in the normal way.

79. The consultations of the special mission during its third phase have indicated that if the authoritative council is established and agrees to implement the proposal for a neutral security force in Kabul, the Council is likely to ask the United Nations to provide financial support for the force. As noted in paragraph 19 above, the Head of the special mission has entered into no commitment in this respect. I have asked him to make it clear, in the next phase of his consultations, that there is no precedent for such a force to be financed directly by the United Nations and that the most that the Afghanistan

parties can expect is the establishment of a voluntary trust fund for which I would solicit contributions from Member States interested in supporting the peace process in Afghanistan. It is, however, likely that, if the security force is established and if the authoritative council so requests, I would recommend the addition of further military or police advisers to the proposed office in Jalalabad/Kabul in order to provide technical assistance to the force.

80. There is one other matter which, though it is not directly covered by the mandate of the special mission, I wish to bring to the attention of the General Assembly. This is the fact that the question of the release from Kabul of the former President, Dr. Najibullah, has not yet been resolved. Four members of his entourage (one woman and three children) were able to leave Kabul for New Delhi in 1994, but Dr. Najibullah and his other three companions remain in the compound of the Office of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Pakistan, where they have been since April 1992. I have written to President Rabbani about this question and have taken it up with a number of Afghan interlocutors. My Personal Representative has done the same. I regret to report that our efforts have not yet produced the desired result. I am greatly concerned that, with continuing heavy fighting in Kabul, Dr. Najibullah's life and those of his colleagues remain in serious danger. I therefore appeal to all Member States that enjoy influence with the various parties to support my efforts to obtain the release of Dr. Najibullah and his companions. I remain ready to make my good offices available to help negotiate any agreement that may be required for this purpose.

81. In conclusion, I believe that the activities of the special mission confirm that there is a role for the United Nations to play in helping to end the conflict in Afghanistan and that conditions may now exist to make substantive progress in that direction. I accordingly seek endorsement by the General Assembly of the approach set out in the present report, and I appeal to all Member States both to support the nascent peace process and to respond generously to the appeals for funds to finance the Organization's various humanitarian and developmental efforts in Afghanistan.

ANNEX

1. Recognizing the special role of reconstruction in the peace process of Afghanistan, Mr. Mestiri asked the UNDP Resident Representative/Resident Coordinator for Afghanistan and the economist of the special mission to travel to different parts of the country to consult with Afghans and United Nations colleagues to identify a series of key reconstruction projects. The major criteria for selection of such projects include the following:

(a) Most should fall within the priorities established by the Action Plan for Immediate Rehabilitation (UNDP, October 1993) and should result from consultations with local authorities and communities;

(b) Their implementation should, to the extent possible, be based on existing technical capacity;

(c) Most projects should be labour intensive to encourage demobilization and should contribute to income generation and the revival of local economies;

(d) They must not lead to increased production of narcotics, and in those areas where production exists, should contribute to reduction;

(e) Some key projects should have a symbolic effect with high visibility and immediate impact;

(f) They should be attractive to donors with obvious sustainability.

2. Key projects, evenly distributed over all parts of the country should receive assistance immediately, since economic stability will contribute to political stability. A package of projects, totalling approximately $105 million will be presented by UNDP to donors in the following broad areas:

(a) Food production and irrigation;

(b) Livestock production;

(c) Water and sanitation, both urban and rural;

(d) Infrastructure (secondary roads, power supply and key airports);

(e) Health and education systems;

(f) Rehabilitation of basic industrial plants.

3. There are three major requirements in the above areas at the present time: (a) full utilization of the potential within existing programmes; (b) urgent initiatives in sectors not currently being addressed because of lack of resources; and (c) special highly visible projects illustrating the renewed interest of the international community in peace and reconstruction:

(a) The major ongoing rehabilitation activities implemented by the United Nations have a considerable absorptive capacity for additional funding, utilizing existing management structures and resulting in wider geographical coverage and accelerated progress towards long-term sustainable development goals. Five specific programmes already have nationwide outreach and delivery mechanisms and have been designed to serve as platforms for additional donor funding. Together they seek a total of $40 million immediate funding for the period 1995-1996, additional to a $37 million commitment already made by UNDP:

(i) Rehabilitation of small-scale rural infrastructure (irrigation, water supply, small structures and access) in direct cooperation with rural communities, which determine priorities. With $17.7 million already committed by UNDP, this programme seeks an additional $17 million for 1995-1996 for increased geographical coverage;

(ii) Food production programmes aiming at increased and improved in-country production of seeds and crops, rehabilitation of orchards, creation of a more self-sustaining plant protection system and general rehabilitation of local farming systems. With $7 million committed by UNDP (for FAO execution), this programme seeks another $10 million for increased outreach and accelerated progress towards sustainable systems;

(iii) A livestock health and production programme working towards a nationwide system of privately sustained district veterinary clinics. With $6 million already committed by UNDP (for FAO execution) this programme seeks another $6 million for increased geographical outreach and accelerated progress towards sustainable livestock production systems;

(iv) Rehabilitation of small-scale urban infrastructure (water supply, sanitation, shelter and access) in direct cooperation with urban communities and neighbourhoods, with $5 million needed for expanded geographical coverage;

(v) Rehabilitation of the disabled, creating a capacity within communities for local rehabilitation and integration of the disabled through a cross-sectoral approach ranging from medical assistance to functional and vocational training. With $2 million committed by UNDP, this programme seeks another $2 million for gradual expansion;

(b) Key priorities which are not being addressed by donors include: power supply in most conurbations, rebuilding and furnishing of schools where teachers are available, urban and rural health systems where qualified staff are already available, and major irrigation systems. The total indicative amount for these programmes might amount to some $35 million;

(c) One of the most significant contributions to the peace process could be high-visibility projects. These would create an image of stability and normality following the recent devastation and will have an immediate impact on employment and economic recovery. These projects should include: key airport facilities such as runways and communications (which would require reciprocal

non-aggression guarantees); industrial plants for cotton, fertilizer, cement and building materials; and city and secondary roads which are not strategic. The total indicative amount could exceed $30 million.